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SMALL TECHNOLOGIES FOR SMALL DEVELOPMENT 
Technology and science policies provide some of the most difficult 
decisions for a small country to make. It is also an area of choice that 
holds considerable promise for development. The barriers are difficult 
because frontier research is so costly and the knowledge base for 
effective use of technology is so large, that it is difficult for small, poor 
countries to gain access, even when the efficient scale of utilization is not 
prohibitively large. It is promising because science and technology have 
demonstrated the capability of allowing countries to overcome limitations 
of economic backwardness and limited resource endowment. 
For awhile, the belief was prevalent that smallness in technology was the 
answer to the problems of poor and/or small countries. Small was 
beautiful! Small was renewable and sustainable. Small was eventually seen 
as a solution to the economic and environmental problems of countries of 
all sizes. To some observers, the self -evident virtues of smallness were 
based on the principles of biology and physics [7] [8]. In the economy of 
the global village, there is no small country problem. 
If the new technologies, be they called small, intermediate, appropriate, 
or alternative, had the potential that their most enthusiastic supporters 
claimed, then there would be little need for a conference such as this. In 
fact, though small, labour-intensive technologies can play a useful role in 
the development process, over-reliance on them intensifies problems of 
economic backwardness. These strategies for the use of technologies bore 
considerable similarity to colonial theses of dualism or to apartheid, even 
though the philosophical thrust was for greater equality and local 
self-determination. Few could argue with the goal of self-reliance, 
though the pursuit of it paradoxically had the effect of making countries 
more dependent. 
Inherent in the thesis of alternate technology was the assumption of 
fixed, finite resources. Living within limits became the order of the day. 
Unfortunately, the conception of technology and renewability falters on 
its own assumptions. For if resources are fixed, then these constraints not 
only limit development, they foretell an inevitable decline. For the very 
theory of entropy that was used as a justification for small technologies 
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doomed civilization to certain decline. Entropy, as strictly interpreted 
defines an irreversible pathway from order to increasing disorder, and 
for energy and mineral resources from concentration and user ability to 
diffuseness and unusability. Recycling can never be 100% effective, and 
each turn of the cycle reduces resource availability. Population growth 
accelerates the decline, while stable or declining population postpones but 
does not prevent the inevitable doom. 
China, a very large country, was used as an example of the potential 
benefits of thinking and acting small. In some respects, furthermore, 
communes and other rural units were still quite large, but they still were 
functional units that gave some sense of potential comparability to small 
countries. Smil writes of "a recent voguish trend in Western academic 
writings" about what was "China's everyday practice for two decades" [9, 
p. 17). A cursory look at China's efforts in using an intermediate type of 
technology can be instructive both as to its potential benefits and its 
limitations. Advocates of alternate technologies have frequently used 
China as an example of the success of small technology despite the fact 
that the governing philosophy of China was expressed in the phrase, 
"walking on two legs." This meant developing both large, complex 
enterprises as well as simple projects in rural areas [10, p. 279]. 
In developing its energy sources, China used a variety of different 
technologies. Though not the first to use biogas (it was developed much 
earlier in India), China has used it more extensively than any other 
country. Not mentioned is the estimate that "a third of China's 7 million 
or so small biogas digesters are under repair"[3, p. 252). China opened 
small earthen and rock dams for hydropower as well as for irrigation and 
flood control. Smil concludes that the "advantages of intermediate energy 
technologies for China are indisputable." 
China is also known for its use of renewable resources and small tech-
nologies in other areas. In agriculture the stories are legion about the far-
mers gathering the night soil from the towns and hauling it back to the 
communes. In addition, China also developed small scale fertilizer plants 
to supplement t.he use of manure. The electricity generated by the small 
hydroplants was used to power small, rural industries. Many of these 
industries turned out cement used to line irrigation canals and small farm 
implements for agricultural mechanization. In all of these areas the 
technologies fulfilled the criteria established for appropriate technology. 
In addition to being small they used local resources, frequently renew-
able, and they used local labour and skills and were generally more 
labour-intensive than comparable technologies in developed countries. 
However, useful and necessary these technologies were, and possibly 
remain, for Chinese economic development, they do have their limit-
ations. For example, the small coal mines were not always economical. 
"The lifetime of many of the small mines was ephemeral," writes Smil, 
"and a large part of production was consumed in an equally ephemeral 
iron-making campaign. In fact, it appears that in many cases the human 
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and animal energy necessary just to open, operate, and maintain the small 
mines surpassed actual energy yield". [IO, p. 280] [12, p. 128). The 
"ephemeral" ironmaking production refers to "backyard furnaces" which 
are hard to label as anything but a disaster .China has been moving 
towards opening larger, more capital-intensive mines (5, p. 94] (11, p. 
19). 
China has a long history of using manure in agriculture. Current use is 
very costly in terms of labour. Overall, at least 20 percent of total 
agricultural labour time (and often 30-50 percent) was absorbed in col-
lecting, processing, transporting, and applying organic fertilizers, which 
made their use both inconvenient and expensive in areas where there was 
a seasonal labour shortage (14, p. 682). Citing a Chinese economist, 
Rawski uses the figure of 30-40 percent of the "total amount of manpo-
wer and animal power expended in the whole year" (6, pp. 95-96). 
Furthermore, contrary to popular belief in many areas, organic fertilizers 
are less efficient as nutrient sources than are the manufactured kind. 
"With organic fertilizers, it is difficult to obtain nutrient proportions that 
match plant requirements," writes Weins. "Since release rates are slow, it 
is impossible to insure concentrated release at appropriate periods of 
plant growth." Organic fertilizers are most effective with use in a reg-
imen that includes chemical fertilizers. Use of organic fertilizers alone 
traps the user in a "vicious circle" that limits further development (14, p. 
682). 
China has received high praise for its innovative methods for small-scale 
manufacturing and the use of chemical fertilizers [4, pp. 94-101). These 
small factories produce either ammonium bicarbonate or aqua ammonia, 
which have a nitrogen content of 16-17 percent, and 14 percent, respect-
ively. This nitrogen content is much lower than that for ammonia urea. 
These fertilizers deteriorate rapidly and are difficult to transport (2, pp. 
425-440]. It is understandable, then, that since 1972 China has been a 
major buyer of large, modern, ammonia urea fertilizer plants. 
Even with the many advantages of small rural industries, large industries 
have the potential for greater productivity. Rawski found that "despite its 
capital intensity, Western industrial technology is so productive that it 
often maintains an advantage in cost as well as quality over the 
alternative methods, even when, as in China, the ratio of capital to 
labour costs is enormously higher than it is in countries for which the 
technology was originally intended" [5, p. 94]. The trend in China has 
been "consistently toward substitution of capital for labour." In some 
instances, capital investment per unit of output was greater in relatively 
small plants. Whatever the benefits of China's rural industries, "the 
capital-saving contribution of small plants is of little significance" [5, p. 
44). 
The small technologies used by China illustrate their inherent limitations. 
The assumption of finite resources is in fact self -fulfilling, and at a 
lower level than realized. For example, on the use of manure as fertilizer, 
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there are two constraints that put a ceiling on expanded utilization. First, 
there would have to be more humans and/or animals to provide the 
manure. As China's current policy shows, more mouths to feed is not the 
way to get more food per capita. More animal manure would require 
dedicating more land to raining stock, and this would likely be 
counter-productive to growing more food. Second, given the large 
expenditure of human time and energy to gather and use the manure, 
there is a severe limit to how much more manure could be used, even if 
available. Of course, some of that constraint could be broken with 
mechanization, but that leads to the path of "non- renewable" resources. 
From 1952 to 1977, grain production was able to grow at 2.3 percent per 
year, staying just ahead of population, which grew at 2.1 percent 
average. Increasing output in agriculture by increasing factor input had 
precisely the outcome predicted by economic theory: it diminished 
returns to factors. As Anthony Tang has stated, "unlike other agricultures 
characterized by dynamic technological productivity advances, growth in 
inputs outpaced growth in outputs, rising 131 percent, compared to 97 
percent output growth. . .. as a consequence, total factor productivity 
dropped 15 percent or 0.6 percent per year" from 1952 to 1977 [13, pp. 
405-410). The decline in factor productivity occurred in a context in 
which China was using selected modern components, such as research in 
seeds, as part of its overall developmental effort. Even with these ele-
ments in its overall endeavor, China recognized that they were reaching 
limits and had to alter their strategy to include more resource-creating 
modern technologies. 
The recent performance of the Chinese economy has been astounding. 
Output and productivity have been rising at rates at least double if not 
triple those previously recorded for China. It could reasonably be argued 
that the small, appropriate technologies were an absolutely essential 
component of the transformation of the Chinese economy and established 
a secure base for the modern accelerated growth. True or false, it does 
not negate the thesis that the employment created by economic expansion 
predicated upon relatively fixed, fininte resources is not sustainable. 
Technique must be transformed into the dynamics of technology and 
resource creation. 
Vaclav Smil sums up the Chinese experience with small technology in a 
memorable phrase: "The Chinese, the world's greatest practitioners of 
frugal smallness, discovered that small is useful but small is not enough." 
TECHNOLOGY, RESOURCE CREATION, AND SMALL COUNTRIES 
Countries that are small both geographically and in terms of population 
tend to be limited in the range of available energy, mineral and soil 
resources. If they are poor, moreover, it reflects both the lack of rich 
resources exploited by outsiders and the lack of internal ability to devel-
op the resources that they have. The inability to develop domestic 
resources is often thought of primarily in terms of financial capital, 
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which can be borrowed, instead of lack of intellectual and technical 
capital, which cannot be. Or, at least, intellectual capital cannot as 
readily and as completely be borrowed through consultants. The best way 
to obtain intellectual and technical capital is to acquire it permanently 
through the education of the population. 
It is knowledge, ideas, skills, human ingenuity, intelligence, human 
capital, or whatever combination of these one wishes to use, that pro-
vides the means of escaping the resource trap both globally and for small 
countries. It is ideas, skills, and behavior that is the essential element in 
technology, and it is technology that creates resources. It is meaningless 
to speak of resources apart from technology. 
If resources were fixed and finite, they were as predicted, increasingly 
more scarce. Their scarcity would be reflected in increasing price. In my 
book, I present massive data (derived from other authors) showing a 
continuing downward movement in the real price of food and mineral 
resources ( 1 ]. Also shown is the sustained increase in per capita food 
production. The very falling real prices for raw commodity exports has 
been a major concern and cause of complaint of third world nations, 
large and small alike. 
The issue of small countries is not small technologies but what is the best 
way to gain access to the best in technology. For many technologies, the 
basic units of the most advanced and sophisticated are very small scale, 
scale-neutral and applicable to third world countries. Here we are 
thinking in terms of such items a micro-chips, agricultural techniques, 
and output from satellites. Unfortunately, the generation of these tech-
nologies is based upon scales of production and a large and sophisticated 
knowledge base beyond most poor countries, large or small. 
The first item on the agenda, then, is cooperative action among small 
countries to generate the knowledge base for applied technologies. 
Current efforts to develop a United Nations biotechnology center is an 
excellent example. Unfortunately, it is only an example of what is being 
attempted and not an example of the many such activities that should be 
in progress. 
The second area is negotiating sustained access to technologies that have 
become vital to the world economies and the small countries within it. To 
its credit, my country, the United States, has treated some of the 
satellites as a common carrier resource. Many countries have benefited 
from the output of these satellites in the form of maps and information. 
These have regularly been made available to users at a nominal fee and 
have had benefits for areas many times the cost to the user. Satellites for 
communication, whether information or mapping, are critical to small 
countries' development, and sustained access must be assured. 
The third item on the agenda is to find ways of adapting sophisticated 
technologies to local needs. Research being done by the International 
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Labour Organization on blending technologies holds great promise. It 
avoids the pitfall of using technologies for which the minimum scale is 
too large for a small country. At the same time, it avoids reliance on low 
productivity, traditional technologies that have an extremely limited 
capacity for change and resource creation. The most sophisticated 
technologies from satellites to computers, from nuclear technologies to 
micro-chips, can play a key role in small country development if they are 
integrated with local technologies. 
An important consideration in the use of any of the technologies is 
linkage of these technologies to the general advances in technology 
worldwide. For not only are modern frontier technologies 
resource-creating, they are the technologies that are experiencing the 
most rapid change and development. Users of these technologies have a 
dynamic, developmental potential built in. Realization of this potential is 
dependent upon communication systems, local knowledge capacity, and 
patent and other rights of access. This latter political dimension is, and 
has been, a top priority item for third world countries in their discussion 
of technology transfer. The desire has been for access to proprietary 
technology at affordable prices, and this is a legitimate concern, 
Linkage to technological change presupposes a local knowledge base to 
exploit them. Too often in technology transfer we have confused the 
movement of hardware with technology. Presence or absence of hardware 
is not an indicator of technology transfer. To make a technology one's 
own, a country must develop an intellectual and skill infrastructure 
capable of commanding it. The resource-creating power of technology 
works best when people with knowledge of local problems also possess 
the knowledge underlying the technology. Investment in education and 
research is also an investment in technology and development. 
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